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Abstract—We consider private information retrieval (PIR)
for distributed storage systems (DSSs) with noncolluding nodes
where data is stored using a non maximum distance separable
(MDS) linear code. It was recently shown that if data is stored
using a particular class of non-MDS linear codes, the MDS-PIR
capacity, i.e., the maximum possible PIR rate for MDS-coded
DSSs, can be achieved. For this class of codes, we prove that the
PIR capacity is indeed equal to the MDS-PIR capacity, giving
the first family of non-MDS codes for which the PIR capacity is
known. For other codes, we provide asymmetric PIR protocols
that achieve a strictly larger PIR rate compared to existing
symmetric PIR protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of private information retrieval (PIR) was first
introduced by Chor et al. [1]. A PIR protocol allows a user
to privately retrieve an arbitrary data item stored in multiple
servers (referred to as nodes in the sequel) without disclosing
any information of the requested item to the nodes. The
efficiency of a PIR protocol is measured in terms of the total
communication cost between the user and the nodes, which
is equal to the sum of the upload and download costs. In
distributed storage systems (DSSs), data is encoded by an
[n, k] linear code and then stored on n nodes in a distributed
manner. Such DSSs are referred to as coded DSSs [2], [3].
One of the primary aims in PIR is the design of efficient
PIR protocols from an information-theoretic perspective. Since
the upload cost does not scale with the file size, the download
cost dominates the total communication cost [3], [4]. Thus,
the efficiency of a PIR protocol is commonly measured by
the amount of information retrieved per downloaded symbol,
referred to as the PIR rate. Recently, Sun and Jafar derived the
maximum achievable PIR rate, the so-called PIR capacity, for
the case of DSSs with replicated data [5], [6]. In the case where
the data stored is encoded by an MDS storage code (the so-
called MDS-coded DSS) and no nodes collude, a closed-form
expression for the PIR capacity, referred to as the MDS-PIR
capacity, was derived in [7].
In the earlier work [8]–[10], the authors focused on the
properties of non-MDS storage codes in order to achieve the
This work was partially funded by the Research Council of Norway (grant
240985/F20) and the Swedish Research Council (grant #2016-04253). This
paper was presented in part at the IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW),
Guangzhou, China, November 2018.
H.-Y. Lin, S. Kumar, and E. Rosnes are with Simula UiB,
N-5020 Bergen, Norway (e-mail: kumarsi@simula.no; lin@simula.no;
eirikrosnes@simula.no).
A. Graell i Amat is with the Department of Electrical Engineering,
Chalmers University of Technology, SE-41296 Gothenburg, Sweden (e-mail:
alexandre.graell@chalmers.se).
MDS-PIR capacity. In particular, in [9], [10] it was shown that
the MDS-PIR capacity can be achieved for a special class of
non-MDS linear codes, which, with some abuse of language,
we refer to as MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes (there might
exist other codes outside of this class that achieve the MDS-
PIR capacity). However, it is still unknown whether the MDS-
PIR capacity is the best possible PIR rate that can be achieved
for an arbitrarily coded DSS. In particular, an expression for
the PIR capacity for coded DSSs with arbitrary linear storage
codes is still missing.
In this paper, we first prove that the PIR capacity of
coded DSSs that use the class of MDS-PIR capacity-achieving
codes introduced in [9] is equal to the MDS-PIR capacity.
We then address the fundamental question of what is the
maximum achievable PIR rate for an arbitrarily coded DSS.
To this purpose, we mainly consider non-MDS-PIR capacity-
achieving codes. Most of the earlier works focus on designing
symmetric PIR protocols and it was shown in [5], [7], [11]
that any PIR scheme can be made symmetric for MDS-coded
DSSs. However, this is in general not the case for non-MDS
codes. Specifically, we propose an asymmetric PIR protocol,
Protocol A, that allows asymmetry in the responses from the
storage nodes. For non-MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes,
Protocol A achieves improved PIR rates compared to the PIR
rates of existing symmetric PIR protocols. Furthermore, we
present an asymmetric PIR protocol, named Protocol B, that
applies to non-MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes that can be
written as a direct sum of MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes.
Finally, we give an example showing that it is possible to
construct an improved (compared to Protocol A) asymmetric
PIR protocol. However, the protocol is code-dependent and
strongly relies on finding good punctured MDS-PIR capacity-
achieving subcodes of the non-MDS-PIR capacity-achieving
code.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND SYSTEM MODEL
A. Notation and Definitions
We denote by N the set of all positive integers and by
Na , {1, 2, . . . , a}. Vectors are denoted by lower case
bold letters, matrices by upper case bold letters, and sets
by calligraphic upper case letters, e.g., x, X , and X denote
a vector, a matrix, and a set, respectively. In addition, X c
denotes the complement of a set X in a universe set. For a
given index set S, we also write XS and YS to represent{
X(m) : m ∈ S
}
and
{
Yl : l ∈ S
}
, respectively. The fonts
of random and deterministic quantities are not distinguished
2typographically since it should be clear from the context. We
denote a submatrix ofX that is restricted in columns by the set
I by X|I . The function LCM(n1, n2, . . . , na) computes the
lowest common multiple of a positive integers n1, n2, . . . , na.
The function H(·) represents the entropy of its argument and
I(· ; ·) denotes the mutual information of the first argument with
respect to the second argument. (·)T denotes the transpose of
its argument. We use the customary code parameters [n, k] to
denote a code C over the finite field GF(q) of blocklength n
and dimension k. A generator matrix of C is denoted by GC,
while CG represents the corresponding code generated by G.
The function χ(x) denotes the support of a vector x, while the
support of a code C is defined as the set of coordinates where
not all codewords are zero. A set of coordinates of C, I ⊆ Nn,
of size k is said to be an information set if and only if GC|I is
invertible. The s-th generalized Hamming weight of an [n, k]
code C, denoted by dCs , s ∈ Nk, is defined as the cardinality
of the smallest support of an s-dimensional subcode of C.
B. System Model
We consider a DSS that stores f files X(1), . . . ,X(f),
where each file X(m) = (x
(m)
i,l ), m ∈ Nf , can be seen as
a random β × k matrix over GF(q) with β, k ∈ N. Assume
that each entry x
(m)
i,l of X
(m) is chosen independently and
uniformly at random from GF(q), m ∈ Nf . Thus,
H
(
X(m)
)
= L, ∀m ∈ Nf ,
H
(
X(1), ...,X(f)
)
= fL (in q-ary units),
where L , β · k. Each file is encoded using a linear code as
follows. Let x
(m)
i =
(
x
(m)
i,1 , . . . , x
(m)
i,k
)
, i ∈ Nβ , be a message
vector corresponding to the i-th row ofX(m). Each x
(m)
i is en-
coded by an [n, k] code C over GF(q) into a length-n codeword
c
(m)
i =
(
c
(m)
i,1 , . . . , c
(m)
i,n
)
. The βf generated codewords c
(m)
i
are then arranged in the array C =
(
(C(1))T| . . . |(C(f))T
)
T
of
dimensions βf × n, where C(m) =
(
(c
(m)
1 )
T| . . . |(c
(m)
β )
T
)
T
.
The code symbols c
(m)
1,l , . . . , c
(m)
β,l , m ∈ Nf , for all f files are
stored on the l-th storage node, l ∈ Nn.
C. Privacy Model
To retrieve fileX(m) from the DSS, the user sends a random
query Q
(m)
l to the l-th node for all l ∈ Nn. In response to the
received query, node l sends the response A
(m)
l back to the
user. A
(m)
l is a deterministic function of Q
(m)
l and the code
symbols stored in the node.
Definition 1. Consider a DSS with n noncolluding nodes
storing f files. A user who wishes to retrieve the m-th file
sends the queries Q
(m)
l , l ∈ Nn, to the storage nodes,
which return the responses A
(m)
l . This scheme achieves perfect
information-theoretic PIR if and only if
Privacy:
I
(
m ;Q
(m)
l , A
(m)
l ,X
(1), . . . ,X(f)
)
= 0, ∀ l ∈ Nn, (1a)
Recovery:
H
(
X(m)
∣∣A(m)1 , . . . , A(m)n , Q(m)1 , . . . , Q(m)n ) = 0. (1b)
D. PIR Rate and Capacity
Definition 2. The PIR rate of a PIR protocol, denoted by R, is
the amount of information retrieved per downloaded symbol,
i.e., R , βk
D
, where D is the total number of downloaded
symbols for the retrieval of a single file.
We will write R(C) to highlight that the PIR rate depends
on the underlying storage code C. It was shown in [7] that for
the noncolluding case and for a given number of files f stored
using an [n, k] MDS code, the MDS-PIR capacity is
C
[n,k]
f ,
n− k
n
[
1−
(k
n
)f]−1
, (2)
where superscript “[n, k]” indicates the code parameters of
the underlying MDS storage code. When the number of files
f tends to infinity, (2) reduces to
C
[n,k]
∞ , lim
f→∞
C
[n,k]
f =
n− k
n
,
which we refer to as the asymptotic MDS-PIR capacity. Note
that for the case of non-MDS linear codes, the PIR capacity
is unknown.
E. MDS-PIR Capacity-Achieving Codes
In [9], two symmetric PIR protocols for coded DSSs, named
Protocol 1 and Protocol 2, were proposed and shown to
achieve the MDS-PIR capacity for certain important classes
of non-MDS codes. Their PIR rates depend on the following
property of the underlying storage code C.
Definition 3. Let C be an arbitrary [n, k] code. A ν×n binary
matrix Λκ,ν(C) is said to be a PIR achievable rate matrix for
C if the following conditions are satisfied.
1) The Hamming weight of each column of Λκ,ν is κ, and
2) for each matrix row λi, i ∈ Nν , χ(λi) always contains
an information set.
The following theorem gives the achievable PIR rate of
Protocol 1 from [9, Thm. 1].
Theorem 1. Consider a DSS that uses an [n, k] code C to
store f files. If a PIR achievable rate matrix Λκ,ν(C) exists,
then the PIR rate
Rf, S(C) ,
(ν − κ)k
κn
[
1−
(κ
ν
)f]−1
(3)
is achievable.
In (3), we use subscript S to indicate that this PIR rate is
achievable by the symmetric Protocol 1 in [9]. Define R∞, S(C)
as the limit of Rf, S(C) as the number of files f tends to infinity,
i.e., R∞, S(C) , limf→∞ Rf, S(C) =
(ν−κ)k
κn
. The asymptotic
PIR rate R∞, S(C) is also achieved by the file-independent
Protocol 2 from [9].
Corollary 1. If a PIR achievable rate matrix Λκ,ν(C) with
κ
ν
= k
n
exists for an [n, k] code C, then the MDS-PIR capacity
(2) is achievable.
3Definition 4. A PIR achievable rate matrix Λκ,ν(C) with
κ
ν
= k
n
for an [n, k] code C is called an MDS-PIR capacity-
achieving matrix, and C is referred to as an MDS-PIR
capacity-achieving code.
In the following, we briefly state a main result for Protocol 1
and Protocol 2 from [9] and compare the required number of
stripes and download cost of these protocols.
Theorem 2. If an MDS-PIR capacity-achieving matrix exists
for an [n, k] code C with κ
ν
= k
n
, then the PIR rates C
[n,k]
f
and C[n,k]∞ are achievable by Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 from
[9], respectively, using the corresponding required β and D.
From Definition 2, we have
nD
β
=


k
(
C
[n,k]
f
)−1
for Protocol 1,
k
(
C
[n,k]
∞
)−1
for Protocol 2.
(4)
Furthermore, the smallest number of stripes β of Protocol 1
and Protocol 2 is equal to νf and LCM(k,n−k)
k
, respectively.
The following theorem from [9, Thm. 3] provides a nec-
essary condition for the existence of an MDS-PIR capacity-
achieving matrix.
Theorem 3. If an MDS-PIR capacity-achieving matrix exists
for an [n, k] code C, then dCs ≥
n
k
s, ∀ s ∈ Nk.
III. PIR CAPACITY FOR MDS-PIR CAPACITY-ACHIEVING
CODES
In this section, we prove that the PIR capacity of MDS-PIR
capacity-achieving codes is equal to the MDS-PIR capacity.
Theorem 4. Consider a DSS that uses an [n, k] MDS-PIR
capacity-achieving code C to store f files. Then, the maximum
achievable PIR rate over all possible PIR protocols, i.e., the
PIR capacity, is equal to the MDS-PIR capacity C
[n,k]
f in (2).
Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 4 provides an expression for the PIR capacity
for the family of MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes (i.e.,
(2)). Moreover, for any finite number of files f and in the
asymptotic case where f tends to infinity, the PIR capacity can
be achieved using Protocols 1 and 2 from [9], respectively.
IV. ASYMMETRY HELPS: IMPROVED PIR PROTOCOLS
In this section, we present three asymmetric PIR protocols
for non-MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes, illustrating that
asymmetry helps to improve the PIR rate. By asymmetry we
simply mean that the number of symbols downloaded from the
different nodes is not the same, i.e., for any fixed m ∈ Nf ,
the entropies H(A
(m)
l ), l ∈ Nn, may be different. This is in
contrast to the case of MDS codes, where any asymmetric
protocol can be made symmetric while preserving its PIR
rate [5], [7], [11]. We start with a simple motivating example
showing that the PIR rate of Protocol 1 from [9] can be
improved for some underlying storage codes.
A. Protocol 1 From [9] is Not Optimal in General
Example 1. Consider the [5, 3] code C with generator matrix
G =

1 0 0 1 00 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1

.
The smallest possible value of κ
ν
for which a PIR achievable
rate matrix exists is 23 and a corresponding PIR achievable
rate matrix is
Λ2,3 =

0 1 1 1 11 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 0

.
It is easy to verify that Λ2,3 above is a PIR achievable rate
matrix for code C. Thus, the largest PIR rate for f = 2 files
with Protocol 1 from [9] is R2, S =
33
5·10 =
27
50 . In Table I
(taken from [9, Sec. IV]), we list the downloaded sums of
code symbols when retrieving file X(1) and f = 2 files are
stored. In the table, for each m ∈ N2 and β = ν
f = 32, the
interleaved code array Y (m) with row vectors y
(m)
i = c
(m)
π(i),
i ∈ N32 , is generated (according to Protocol 1 from [9]) by a
randomly selected permutation function π(·).
Observe that since {2, 3, 4} ⊂ χ(λ1) = {2, 3, 4, 5} is an
information set of C, the five sums of{
y
(1)
2(1−1)+1,5, y
(1)
2(1−1)+2,5, y
(2)
3·0+1,5, y
(1)
2·3+1,5 + y
(2)
3·0+3,5, y
(2)
3·1+1,5
}
are not necessarily required to recover X(1). For privacy
concerns, notice that the remaining sums of code symbols from
the 5-th node would be{
y
(2)
3·0+2,5, y
(1)
2(2−1)+1,5, y
(1)
2·(2−1)+2,5, y
(2)
3·1+2,5, y
(1)
2·3+2,5 + y
(2)
3·1+3,5
}
.
This ensures the privacy condition, since for every combina-
tion of files, the user downloads the same number of linear
sums. This shows that by allowing asymmetry in the responses
from the storage nodes, the PIR rate can be improved to
27
50−5 =
27
45 =
3
5 , which is much closer to the MDS-PIR
capacity C
[5,3]
2 =
1
1+ 3
5
= 58 .
Example 1 indicates that for a coded DSS using a non-MDS-
PIR capacity-achieving code, there may exist an asymmetric
PIR scheme that improves the PIR rate of the symmetric
Protocol 1 from [9].
B. Protocol A: A General Asymmetric PIR Protocol
In this subsection, we show that for non-MDS-PIR capacity-
achieving codes, by discarding the redundant coordinates that
are not required to form an information set within χ(λi), i ∈
Nν , it is always possible to obtain a larger PIR rate compared
to that of Protocol 1 from [9].
Theorem 5. Consider a DSS that uses an [n, k] code C to
store f files. If a PIR achievable rate matrix Λκ,ν(C) exists,
then the PIR rate
Rf,A(C) ,
(
1−
κ
ν
)[
1−
(κ
ν
)f]−1
(5)
is achievable.
Proof: See Appendix B.
4Table I
PROTOCOL 1 WITH A [5, 3] NON-MDS-PIR CAPACITY-ACHIEVING CODE FOR f = 2
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5
y
(1)
2(2−1)+1,1
y
(1)
2(1−1)+1,2
y
(1)
2(1−1)+1,3
y
(1)
2(1−1)+1,4
y
(1)
2(1−1)+1,5
y
(1)
2(2−1)+2,1
y
(1)
2(1−1)+2,2
y
(1)
2(1−1)+2,3
y
(1)
2(1−1)+2,4
y
(1)
2(1−1)+2,5
ro
u
n
d
1
y
(2)
3·0+2,1 y
(2)
3·0+1,2 y
(2)
5·0+1,3 y
(2)
3·0+1,4 y
(2)
3·0+1,5
re
p
et
it
io
n
1
y
(2)
3·0+3,1 y
(2)
3·0+3,2 y
(2)
3·0+3,3 y
(2)
3·0+2,4 y
(2)
3·0+2,5
rnd. 2 y
(1)
2·3+2,1 + y
(2)
3·0+1,1 y
(1)
2·3+1,2 + y
(2)
3·0+2,2 y
(1)
2·3+1,3 + y
(2)
3·0+2,3 y
(1)
2·3+1,4 + y
(2)
3·0+3,4 y
(1)
2·3+1,5 + y
(2)
3·0+3,5
y
(1)
2(3−1)+1,1
y
(1)
2(3−1)+1,2
y
(1)
2(3−1)+1,3
y
(1)
2(2−1)+1,4
y
(1)
2(2−1)+1,5
y
(1)
2(3−1)+2,1
y
(1)
2(3−1)+2,2
y
(1)
2(3−1)+2,3
y
(1)
2(2−1)+2,4
y
(1)
2(2−1)+2,5
ro
u
n
d
1
y
(2)
3·1+2,1 y
(2)
3·1+1,2 y
(2)
3·1+1,3 y
(2)
3·1+1,4 y
(2)
3·1+1,5
re
p
et
it
io
n
2
y
(2)
3·1+3,1 y
(2)
3·1+3,2 y
(2)
3·1+3,3 y
(2)
3·1+2,4 y
(2)
3·1+2,5
rnd. 2 y
(1)
2·3+3,1 + y
(2)
3·1+1,1 y
(1)
2·3+3,2 + y
(2)
3·1+2,2 y
(1)
2·3+3,3 + y
(2)
3·1+2,3 y
(1)
2·3+2,4 + y
(2)
3·1+3,4 y
(1)
2·3+2,5 + y
(2)
3·1+3,5
We will make use of the following lemma from [9, Lem. 2].
Lemma 1. If a matrix Λν,κ(C) exists for an [n, k] code C,
then we have
κ
ν
≥
k
n
,
where equality holds if χ(λi), i ∈ Nν , are all information
sets.
Proposition 1 can be easily verified using Lemma 1.
Proposition 1. Consider a DSS that uses an [n, k] code C to
store f files. Then, Rf, S(C) ≤ Rf,A(C) ≤ C
[n,k]
f with equality
if and only if C is an MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code.
Proof: The result follows since
Rf, S(C) =
(ν − κ)k
κn
[
1−
(κ
ν
)f]−1
≤
(ν − κ)k
κn− (κn− νk)
[
1−
(κ
ν
)f]−1
(6)
=
(
1−
κ
ν
)[
1−
(κ
ν
)f]−1
= Rf,A(C)
=
[
1 +
κ
ν
+ · · ·+
(κ
ν
)f−1]−1
(7)
≤
[
1 +
k
n
+ · · ·+
(k
n
)f−1]−1
= C
[n,k]
f ,
where both (6) and (7) hold since κ
ν
≥ k
n
.
In the following, we refer to the asymmetric PIR protocol
that achieves the PIR rate in Theorem 5 as Protocol A
(thus the subscript A in Rf,A(C) in (5)). Similar to Theo-
rem 1, there also exists an asymmetric file-independent PIR
protocol that achieves the asymptotic PIR rate R∞,A(C) ,
limf→∞ Rf,A(C) = 1−
κ
ν
and we simply refer to this protocol
as the file-independent Protocol A.1, Λκ,ν(C) can be used for
both the file-dependent Protocol A and the file-independent
Protocol A.
1As for Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 from [9, Remark 2]
C. Protocol B: An Asymmetric PIR Protocol for a Special
Class of Non-MDS-PIR Capacity-Achieving Codes
In this subsection, we focus on designing an asymmetric
PIR protocol, referred to as Protocol B, for a special class of
[n, k] non-MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes, where the code
is isometric to a direct sum of P ∈ Nn MDS-PIR capacity-
achieving codes [12, Ch. 2]. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the generator matrix G of an [n, k] non-MDS-
PIR capacity-achieving code C has the structure
G =


G1
G2
. . .
GP

, (8)
where Gp, of size kp×np, is the generator matrix of a punc-
tured MDS-PIR capacity-achieving subcode CGp , p ∈ NP .
Theorem 6. Consider a DSS that uses an [n, k] non-MDS-
PIR capacity-achieving code C to store f files. If the code C
is isometric to a direct sum of P ∈ Nn MDS-PIR capacity-
achieving codes as in (8), then the PIR rate
Rf,B(C) ,
(
P∑
p=1
kp
k
(
C
[np,kp]
f
)−1)−1
(9)
is achievable. Moreover, the asymptotic PIR rate
R∞,B(C) , lim
f→∞
Rf,B(C) =
(
P∑
p=1
kp
k
(
C
[np,kp]
∞
)−1)−1
(10)
is achievable by a file-independent PIR protocol.
Proof: See Appendix C.
We remark that Protocol B requires β = LCM(β1, . . . , βP )
stripes, where βp, p ∈ NP , is the smallest number of stripes
of either Protocol 1 or Protocol 2 for a DSS that uses only the
punctured MDS-PIR capacity-achieving subcode CGp to store
f files (see the proof in Appendix C and Theorem 2 for the
smallest number of stripes βp).
Theorem 6 can be used to obtain a larger PIR rate for the
non-MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code in Example 1.
5Table II
RESPONSES BY PROTOCOL C WITH A [9, 5] NON-MDS-PIR CAPACITY-ACHIEVING CODE
Subresponses Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5 Node 6 Node 7 Node 8 Node 9
Subresponse 1 I1 + x
(m)
1,1 I2 I3 + x
(m)
1,3 I4 + x
(m)
1,4 I5 + x
(m)
1,5 I4 + I5 I3 + I5 I3 + I4 + I5 I1 + I2 + I4 + I5
Subresponse 2 I6 I7 + x
(m)
1,2 I9 I10 I6 + I7 + I9 + I10
Example 2. Continuing with Example 1, by elementary matrix
operations, the generator matrix of the [5, 3] code of Exam-
ple 1 is equivalent to the generator matrix
1 0 1 0 00 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1

 = (G1
G2
)
.
It can easily be verified that both CG1 and CG2 are MDS-
PIR capacity-achieving codes. Hence, from Theorem 6, the
asymptotic PIR rate
R∞,B =
(
2
3
1
1− 23
+
1
3
1
1− 12
)−1
=
3
8
is achievable. R∞,B =
3
8 is strictly larger than both R∞, S =
3
10 and R∞,A =
1
3 .
D. Protocol C: Code-Dependent Asymmetric PIR Protocol
In this subsection, we provide a code-dependent, but
file-independent asymmetric PIR protocol for non-MDS-PIR
capacity-achieving codes that cannot be decomposed into a
direct sum of MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes as in (8).
The protocol is tailor-made for each class of storage codes. The
main principle of the protocol is to further reduce the number
of downloaded symbols by looking at punctured MDS-PIR
capacity-achieving subcodes. Compared to Protocol A, which
is simpler and allows for a closed-form expression for its PIR
rate, Protocol C gives larger PIR rates.
The file-independent Protocol 2 from [9] utilizes interfer-
ence symbols. An interference symbol can be defined through
a summation as [9]
Ik(h−1)+h′ ,
f∑
m=1
mβ∑
j=(m−1)β+1
uh,jx
(m)
j−(m−1)β,h′ ,
where h, h′ ∈ Nk and the symbols uh,j are chosen indepen-
dently and uniformly at random from the same field as the
code symbols.
Example 3. Consider a [9, 5] code C with generator matrix
G =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1

.
It has dC2 = 3 <
9
5 · 2, thus it is not MDS-PIR capacity-
achieving (see Theorem 3). Note that this code cannot be
decomposed into a direct sum of MDS-PIR capacity-achieving
codes as in (8).
The smallest κ
ν
for which a PIR achievable rate matrix exists
for this code is 23 , and a corresponding PIR achievable rate
matrix is
Λ2,3 =

0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 11 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0

.
The idea of the file-independent Protocol 2 from [9] is to
use the information sets I1 = {2, 6, 7, 8, 9} and I2 =
{1, 3, 4, 5, 9} to recover the βk = 1 · 5 requested file sym-
bols that are located in I3 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Specifically,
we use the information set I1 to reconstruct the required
code symbols located in χ(λ1)
c
= {1, 3, 4, 5} and I2 ⊆
χ(λ2) = {1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} to reconstruct the required code
symbol located in χ(λ2)
c
= {2}. Since the code coordinates
{1, 2, 4, 5, 9} form an [n′, k′] = [5, 4] punctured MDS-PIR
capacity-achieving subcode CG
′
with generator matrix
G′ =


1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1

,
it can be seen that the code coordinates {1, 4, 5, 9} are
sufficient to correct the erasure located in χ(λ2)
c
. Therefore,
compared to Protocol A, we can further reduce the required
number of downloaded symbols. The responses from the nodes
when retrieving file X(m) are listed in Table II. The PIR rate
of Protocol C is then equal to
R∞,C =
1 · 5
n+ n′
=
5
14
<
4
9
= C[9,5]∞ ,
which is strictly larger than R∞,A =
1
3 . Notice that it can
readily be seen from Table II that the privacy condition in
(1a) is ensured.
Finally, we remark that, using the same principle as outlined
above, other punctured MDS-PIR capacity-achieving subcodes
can be used to construct a valid protocol, giving the same PIR
rate. For instance, we could pick the two punctured subcodes
CG1 and CG2 with generator matrices
G1 =

1 0 0 0 1 10 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 1

 and G2 = (1 0 10 1 1
)
,
respectively.
Example 3 above illustrates the main working principle of
Protocol C and how the redundant set of code coordinates
is taken into account. Its general description will be given
in a forthcoming extended version. However, some numerical
results are given below, showing that it can attain larger PIR
rates than Protocol A.
6Table III
PIR RATE FOR DIFFERENT CODES AND PROTOCOLS
Code κ
ν
R
∞, S R∞,A R∞,B R∞,C C
[n.k]
∞
C1 : [5, 3] 2/3 0.3 0.3333 0.375 0.375 0.4
C2 : [9, 5] 2/3 0.2778 0.3333 − 0.3571 0.4444
C3 : [7, 4] 3/5 0.3810 0.4 − 0.4 0.4286
C4 : [11, 6] 3/4 0.1818 0.25 − 0.2824 0.4545
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In Table III, we compare the PIR rates for different protocols
using several binary linear codes. The second column gives
the smallest fraction κ
ν
for which a PIR achievable rate
matrix exists. In the table, code C1 is from Example 1, code
C2 is from Example 3, C3 is a [7, 4] code with generator
matrix (1, 2, 4, 8, 8, 14, 5) (in decimal form, e.g., (1, 0, 1, 1)T
is represented by 13) and dC33 = 5 <
7
4 ·3, and C4 is an [11, 6]
code with generator matrix (1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 48, 40, 24, 56, 55)
and dC43 = 4 <
11
6 · 3. Note that C2, C3, and C4 cannot be
decomposed into a direct sum of MDS-PIR capacity-achieving
codes as in (8). For all presented codes except C3, Protocol C
achieves strictly larger PIR rate than Protocol A, although
smaller than the MDS-PIR capacity.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proved that the PIR capacity for MDS-PIR capacity-
achieving codes is equal to the MDS-PIR capacity for the
case of noncolluding nodes, giving the first family of non-
MDS codes for which the PIR capacity is known. We also
showed that allowing asymmetry in the responses from the
storage nodes yields larger PIR rates compared to symmetric
protocols in the literature when the storage code is a non-
MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code. We proposed three asym-
metric protocols and compared them in terms of PIR rate for
different storage codes.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Achievability is by Theorem 1 and Corollary 1. Hence,
in this appendix, we only provide the converse proof of
Theorem 4.
Before we proceed with the converse proof, we give some
general results that hold for any PIR protocol.
1) Given a query Q
(m)
l sent to the l-th node, m ∈ Nf ,
the response A
(m)
l received by the user is a function
of Q
(m)
l and the f coded chunks (denoted by cl ,(
c
(1)
1,l , . . . , c
(1)
β,l , c
(2)
1,l , . . . , c
(f)
β,l
)
T
) that are stored in the l-th
node. It follows that
H
(
A
(m)
l
∣∣Q(m)l ,XNf ) = H(A(m)l ∣∣Q(m)l , cl) = 0. (11)
2) From the condition of privacy, the l-th node should not
be able to differentiate between the responses A
(m)
l and
A
(m′)
l when the user requests X
(m), m 6= m′. Hence,
H
(
A
(m)
l
∣∣Q,X(m)) = H(A(m′)l ∣∣Q,X(m)), (12)
where Q ,
{
Q
(m)
l : m ∈ Nf , l ∈ Nn
}
denotes the set
of all possible queries made by the user. Although this
seems to be intuitively true, a proof of this property is
still required and can be found in [13, Lem. 3].
3) Consider a PIR protocol for a coded DSS that uses an
[n, k] code C to store f files. For any subset of filesM⊆
Nf and for any information set I of C, we have
H
(
A
(m)
I
∣∣XM,Q) =∑
l∈I
H
(
A
(m)
l
∣∣XM,Q). (13)
The proof uses the linear independence of the columns of
a generator matrix of C corresponding to an information
set, and can be seen as a simple extension of [7, Lem. 2]
or [13, Lem. 4].
Next, we state Shearer’s Lemma, which represents a very
useful entropy method for combinatorial problems.
Lemma 2 (Shearer’s Lemma [14]). Let S be a collection
of subsets of Nn, with each l ∈ Nn included in at least κ
members of S . For random variables Z1, . . . , Zn, we have∑
S∈S
H(ZS) ≥ κH(Z1, . . . , Zn).
Now, we are ready for the converse proof. By Lemma 1,
since the code C is MDS-PIR capacity-achieving, there exist ν
information sets I1, . . . , Iν such that each coordinate l ∈ Nn
is included in exactly κ members of I = {I1, . . . , Iν} with
κ
ν
= k
n
.
Applying the chain rule of entropy we have
H
(
A
(m)
Nn
∣∣XM,Q) ≥ H(A(m)
Ii
∣∣XM,Q), ∀ i ∈ Nν .
Let m ∈ M and m′ ∈ Mc , Nf \M. Following similar
steps as in the proof given in [7], [13], we get
ν H
(
A
(m)
Nn
∣∣XM,Q)
≥
ν∑
i=1
H
(
A
(m)
Ii
∣∣XM,Q)
=
ν∑
i=1
(∑
l∈Ii
H
(
A
(m)
l
∣∣XM,Q)
)
(14)
=
ν∑
i=1
(∑
l∈Ii
H
(
A
(m′)
l
∣∣XM,Q)
)
(15)
=
ν∑
i=1
H
(
A
(m′)
Ii
∣∣XM,Q) (16)
≥ κH
(
A
(m′)
Nn
∣∣XM,Q) (17)
= κ
[
H
(
A
(m′)
Nn
,X(m
′)
∣∣XM,Q)
−H
(
X(m
′)
∣∣A(m′)
Nn
,XM,Q
)]
= κ
[
H
(
X(m
′)
∣∣XM,Q)
+ H
(
A
(m′)
Nn
∣∣XM,X(m′),Q)− 0] (18)
= κ
[
H
(
X(m
′)
∣∣XM)+H(A(m′)
Nn
∣∣XM,X(m′),Q)], (19)
where (14) and (16) follow from (13), (15) is because of (12),
(17) is due to Shearer’s Lemma, (18) is from the fact that the
m′-th file X(m
′) is determined by the responses A
(m′)
Nn
and
7the queries Q, and finally, (19) follows from the independence
between the queries and the files. Therefore, we can conclude
that
H
(
A
(m)
Nn
∣∣XM,Q)
≥
κ
ν
H
(
X(m
′)
∣∣XM)+ κ
ν
H
(
A
(m′)
Nn
∣∣XM,X(m′),Q)
=
k
n
H
(
X(m
′)
∣∣XM)+ k
n
H
(
A
(m′)
Nn
∣∣XM,X(m′),Q), (20)
where we have used Definition 4 to obtain (20).
Since there are in total f files, we can recursively use (20)
f − 1 times to obtain
H
(
A
(1)
Nn
∣∣X(1),Q)
≥
f−1∑
m=1
(k
n
)m
H
(
X(m+1)
∣∣XNm)
+
(k
n
)f−1
H
(
A
(f)
Nn
∣∣XNf ,Q)
=
f−1∑
m=1
(k
n
)m
H
(
X(m)
∣∣XNm−1) (21)
=
f−1∑
m=1
(k
n
)m
L, (22)
where (21) follows from (11). (22) holds since H
(
X(m)
∣∣
XNm−1
)
= H
(
X(m)
)
= L.
Now,
L = H
(
X(1)
)
= H
(
X(1)
∣∣Q)− H(X(1) ∣∣A(1)
Nn
,Q
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(23)
= I
(
X(1) ;A
(1)
Nn
∣∣Q)
= H
(
A
(1)
Nn
∣∣∣Q)− H(A(1)
Nn
∣∣∣X(1),Q)
≤ H
(
A
(1)
Nn
∣∣∣Q)− f−1∑
m=1
(k
n
)m
L, (24)
where (23) follows since any file is independent of the queries
Q, and knowing the responses A
(1)
Nn
and the queries Q, one
can determine X(1). Inequality (24) holds because of (22).
Finally, the converse proof is completed by showing that
R =
L∑n
l=1 H
(
A
(1)
l
)
≤
L
H
(
A
(1)
Nn
) (25)
≤
L
H
(
A
(1)
Nn
∣∣∣Q) (26)
≤
1
1 +
∑f−1
m=1
(
k
n
)m = C[n,k]f , (27)
where (25) holds because of the chain rule of entropy, (26)
is due to the fact that conditioning reduces entropy, and we
apply (24) to obtain (27).
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The theorem is proved by showing that some downloaded
symbols in Protocol 1 from [9] are not really necessary both
from the recovery and the privacy perspective. The resulting
protocol is named Protocol A, and the proof is based on the
fact that for a PIR achievable rate matrix Λκ,ν(C) of a code
C, to recover a file of size β× k, exactly νk code coordinates
of the ν information sets {χ(λi)}i∈Nν are required to be
exploited in Protocol 1. In order to illustrate the achievability
proof, we have to review the steps and proof of Protocol 1 in
[9, Sec. IV and App. B], and we refer the reader to [9] for
the details. In particular, Protocol 1 in [9] is constructed from
two matrices as defined below.
Definition 5. For a given ν × n PIR achievable rate matrix
Λκ,ν(C) = (λu,l), we define the PIR interference matrices
Aκ×n = (ai,l) and B(ν−κ)×n = (bi,l) for the code C with
ai,l , u if λu,l = 1, ∀ l ∈ Nn, i ∈ Nκ, u ∈ Nν ,
bi,l , u if λu,l = 0, ∀ l ∈ Nn, i ∈ Nν−κ, u ∈ Nν .
Note that in Definition 5, for each l ∈ Nn, distinct values
of u ∈ Nν should be assigned for all i. Thus, the assignment
is not unique in the sense that the order of the entries of each
column of A and B can be permuted. Further, by S(a|Aκ×n)
we denote the set of column coordinates of matrix Aκ×n =
(ai,l) in which at least one of its entries is equal to a, i.e.,
S(a|Aκ×n) , {l ∈ Nn : ∃ ai,l = a, i ∈ Nκ}.
Thus, Definition 5 leads to the following claim.
Claim 1 ([9, Claim 1]). S(a|Aκ×n) contains an information
set of code C, ∀ a ∈ Nν . Moreover, for an arbitrary entry
bi,l of B(ν−κ)×n, S(bi,l|Aκ×n) = S(a|Aκ×n) ⊆ Nn \ {l} if
bi,l = a.
From Definition 5 we see that there are in total κn entries in
A and each entry ai,l is related to a coordinate within χ(λi),
i ∈ Nν , l ∈ Nn. In Protocol 1 the user downloads the needed
symbols in a total of κ repetitions and in the i-th repetition,
i ∈ Nκ, the user downloads the required symbols in a total of
f rounds. Two types of symbols are downloaded by the user,
desired symbols, which are directly related to the requested
file (say X(1)), and undesired symbols, which are not related
to the requested file, but are exploited to decode the requested
file from the desired symbols.
Consider a fixed i ∈ Nκ and denote by D(ai,l) the total
download cost of Protocol 1 resulting from a particular entry
ai,l, l ∈ Nn. First, we focus on the undesired symbols
downloaded in Step 2 of Protocol 1. In each repetition the
user downloads
κ
(
f−1
ℓ
)[
U(ℓ)− 1−U(ℓ − 1) + 1
]
κ
=
(
f − 1
ℓ
)
κf−(ℓ+1)(ν − κ)ℓ−1
8undesired symbols resulting from a particular ai,l in the ℓ-th
round, ℓ ∈ Nf−1, where U(ℓ) ,
∑ℓ
h=1 κ
f−(h+1)(ν − κ)h−1.
Hence, for the undesired symbols associated with ai,l, in total
κ
(
f − 1
ℓ
)
κf−(ℓ+1)(ν − κ)ℓ−1
=
(
f − 1
ℓ
)
κf−ℓ(ν − κ)ℓ−1 (28)
symbols are downloaded in every ℓ-th round of all κ repeti-
tions.
Secondly, for a particular entry ai,l in the i-th repetition,
the user downloads κf−1 desired symbols from the l-th node
in round ℓ = 1, and
W(ℓ)− 1−W(ℓ − 1) + 1 =
(
f − 1
ℓ
)
κf−(ℓ+1)(ν − κ)ℓ (29)
extra desired symbols in the (ℓ+1)-th round, ℓ ∈ Nf−1, where
W(ℓ) is defined as
W(ℓ) , κf−1 +
ℓ∑
h=1
(
f − 1
h
)
κf−(h+1)(ν − κ)h.
In summary, using (28) and (29), the download cost asso-
ciated to entry ai,l is obtained as
D(ai,l) =
f−1∑
ℓ=1
(
f − 1
ℓ
)
κf−ℓ(ν − κ)ℓ−1
+
f−1∑
ℓ=0
(
f − 1
ℓ
)
κf−(ℓ+1)(ν − κ)ℓ
=
νf − κf
ν − κ
.
In the part of Step 2 of Protocol 1 that exploits side
information, we only require ν information sets induced by
the matrix A to reconstruct code symbols induced by B.
Moreover, from [9, App. B], after Step 2 of Protocol 1,
β = νf rows of code symbols of length n have been
downloaded, and again the information sets induced by the
matrix A are enough to recover all length-k stripes of the
requested file. In other words, κn − νk entries of A are
redundant for the reconstruction of all β = νf stripes of the
requested file. Thus, the improved PIR rate becomes
βk
D
=
νfk
download cost of Protocol 1− (κn− νk)D(ai,l)
=
νfk
κn
ν−κ
[
νf − κf
]
− κn−νk
ν−κ
[
νf − κf
]
=
νfk
νk
ν−κ
[
νf − κf
] = (1− κ
ν
)[
1−
(κ
ν
)f]−1
.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that by removing the
redundant downloaded sums of code symbols in Protocol 1,
it can be shown that within each storage node in each round
ℓ ∈ Nf of all repetitions, file symmetry still remains. This
follows from a similar argumentation as in the privacy part of
the proof of Protocol 1 in [9, App. B]. In the following, we
briefly explain that in each round ℓ ∈ Nf of all repetitions,
for each particular entry ai,l and for every combination of files
M ⊆ Nf with |M| = ℓ, the user requests the same number
of every possible combination of files in D(ai,l).
• In the first round (ℓ = 1) of all κ repetitions, it follows
from (28) that, for each m′ ∈ N2:f , the number of
downloaded undesired symbols resulting from a particular
entry ai,l is κ
f−1, the same as the number of downloaded
desired symbols resulting from ai,l.
• In the (ℓ + 1)-th round of all κ repetitions, ℓ ∈ Nf−2,
arbitrarily choose a combination of files M ⊆ N2:f ,
where |M| = ℓ. For a particular entry ai,l, it follows
from (29) that the total number of downloaded desired
symbols for files pertaining to {1} ∪ M is equal to
κf−(ℓ+1)(ν − κ)ℓ. On the other hand, for the undesired
symbols resulting from a particular ai,l, it follows from
(28) that in the (ℓ + 1)-th round the user downloads
κf−(ℓ+1)(ν − κ)ℓ linear sums for a combination of files
M ⊆ N2:f , |M| = ℓ + 1. Thus, in rounds Nf−1 \ {1},
an equal number of linear sums for all combinations of
files M⊆ Nf are downloaded.
• In the f -th round, only desired symbols are downloaded.
Since each desired symbol is a linear combination of code
symbols from all f files, an equal number of linear sums
is again downloaded from each file.
In summary, in response to each particular ai,l, the user
downloads the same number of linear sums for every possible
combination of files. As illustrated above, this is inherent from
Protocol 1, and hence the privacy condition of (1a) is still
satisfied.
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The result follows by treating Protocol 1 and Proto-
col 2 from [9] as subprotocols for each punctured MDS-PIR
capacity-achieving subcode CGp , p ∈ NP . If Protocol 1 is used
as a subprotocol, then we obtain the file-dependent Protocol B
and the PIR rate in (9), while if Protocol 2 is used as a
subprotocol, then we obtain the file-independent Protocol B
and the PIR rate in (10).
For the asymmetric Protocol B, we require β =
LCM(β1, . . . , βP ) stripes, where βp, p ∈ NP , is the smallest
number of stripes of either Protocol 1 or Protocol 2 for a DSS
that uses only the punctured MDS-PIR capacity-achieving
subcode CGp to store f files (see Theorem 2). Note that for
Protocol 1 the index preparation2 should be made for all β
stripes. Since
∑P
p=1 kp = k and
∑P
p=1 np = n, to privately
retrieve the entire requested file consisting of k symbols in
each stripe, we have to privately recover all P substripes of
all β stripes, where the p-th substripe is of length kp, by
processing the subprotocol (either Protocol 1 or Protocol 2) for
every punctured subcode CGp . In particular, for each punctured
subcode CGp we repeat the subprotocol β/βp times to recover
all the length-kp requested substripes. This can be done since
both Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 recover βp stripes of length kp,
2This terminology was introduced in Step 1 of Protocol 1 from [9], i.e., the
indices of the rows for each file are interleaved randomly and independently
of each other.
9while repeating it β/βp times enables the recovery of β length-
kp substripes. Note that privacy is ensured since the storage
nodes of each punctured subcode are disjoint and within
the nodes associated with each punctured subcode CGp the
subprotocol (Protocol 1 or Protocol 2) yields privacy against
each server [9].
Denote by Dp the total download cost for each node for the
punctured subcode CGp using the subprotocol, p ∈ NP . The
PIR rates of the file-dependent and file-independent Protocol B
are given by
βk
D
=
βk
P∑
p=1
β
βp
npDp
(30)
=
(
P∑
p=1
1
k
npDp
βp
)−1
=


(
P∑
p=1
1
k
kp
(
C
[np,kp]
f
)−1)−1
if Protocol 1 is used as subprotocol,(
P∑
p=1
1
k
kp
(
C
[np,kp]
∞
)−1)−1
if Protocol 2 is used as subprotocol,
(31)
where (30) holds since within each punctured subcode, the
subprotocol is required to be repeated β
βp
times and (31)
follows from (4).
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